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Abstract. Patients suffering from various types of dementia usually present an impaired 
performance with specific categories like animals, furniture, etc. This impairment is known as 
category-specific semantic deficit and can provide us with vital information as to how the 
conceptual-semantic knowledge is stored and organized in the brain. Until date, no theoretical 
model has been able to appropriately account for the unsystematic and varied patterns of category-
specific semantic deficits found so far. Moreover, there seems to be no correlation between the 
type of brain damage and the pattern of memory loss, nor can the latter be accounted for by any of 
the so far proposed models of conceptual knowledge representation and storage in the brain. Our 
purpose is to adapt and provide a theoretical model that builds on FunGramKB ontology and helps 
understand and properly interpret the available empirical data. The advantage that comes from the 
use of this complex theoretical model is that it will allow us to pinpoint the break of the conceptual 
chain, providing a more accurate measure of the location of the semantic memory loss. 
Keywords: Semantic memory; category-specific deficit; dementia; ontology. 
 
[es] Caracterización de la pérdida de la memoria semántica: hacia la 
localización del deterioro lingüístico 
Resumen. Los pacientes que padecen distintos tipos de demencia generalmente presentan una 
disminución en el rendimiento con categorías específicas tales como animales, mobiliario, etc. Este 
deterioro se conoce como deterioro semántico de categorías específicas y nos puede proporcionar 
información vital en cuanto a cómo el conocimiento conceptual semántico se almacena y se 
organiza en el cerebro. Hasta la fecha, ningún modelo teórico ha sido capaz de explicar 
adecuadamente los patrones no sistemáticos y variados de los deterioros semánticos de categorías 
específicas encontrados por el momento. Por otra parte, parece no haber ninguna correlación entre 
el tipo de daño cerebral y el patrón de pérdida de memoria, ni tampoco puede este último ser 
explicado por los modelos existentes sobre la representación del conocimiento conceptual y el 
almacenamiento de la información en el cerebro. Nuestro propósito es adaptar y proporcionar un 
modelo teórico que se basa en la ontología de FunGramKB, y que ayuda a comprender e interpretar 
adecuadamente los datos empíricos disponibles. La ventaja de utilizar este modelo teórico es que 
nos permite detectar la ruptura de la cadena conceptual, proporcionando una medida más precisa 
de la localización de la pérdida de la memoria semántica. 
Palabras clave: Memoria semántica; deterioro de categorías específicas; demencia; ontología. 
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1. Introduction 
Patients suffering from various types of dementia (e.g. Alzheimer’s disease, 
mild cognitive impairment, semantic dementia) and aphasias usually present an 
impaired ability to identify specific categories of objects. This ability can be 
selectively impaired. For example, an individual may have a compromised 
performance in certain tasks when living things are involved, e.g. fruits and 
animals, while her performance remains relatively intact when other non-living 
thing categories like furniture and clothes are involved. Hence, this impairment 
is known as category-specific semantic deficit (Capitani et al. 2003; Peraita & 
Moreno 2003; Laws et al. 2007; Pérez Cabello de Alba 2017, among others). 
This kind of cognitive deficit is crucial since it can provide us with vital 
information as to how semantic knowledge is stored and organized in the brain 
(Capitani et al. 2003). 
 In the literature, a great amount of data can be found that supports the 
existence of category-specific semantic deficits in cases of brain damage. In 
fact, different authors have identified very different patterns of selective 
impairment (see Laws et al. 2007; Peraita & Grasso 2010; Rodríguez Rojo et al. 
2015, to name but a few). Usually, such patterns can not be accounted for by 
the type of brain damage. This is so because often, patients with a type of 
dementia in one study present a specific selective impairment, such as problems 
with living things, whereas in another study, a group of patients with the same 
type of dementia present the reverse impairment (i.e. problems with non-living 
things and no problems at all with living things). Besides, recent studies have 
identified a series of nuisance variables, like item familiarity, that account for 
much of the effect found in category-specific semantic deficits. Nevertheless, 
this selective deficit seems to exist even when all the nuisance variables have 
been controlled (Bunn et al. 1998; Cree & McRae 2003; Laws et al. 2007, 
Moreno-Martínez & Rodríguez Rojo 2015). 
 Until date, no theoretical model has been able to appropriately account for 
the unsystematic and varied patterns of category-specific semantic deficits 
found so far. Thus, our purpose here is to provide and adapt a theoretical model 
that helps understand the available empirical data on semantic memory loss by 
locating the language breakdown along conceptual chains that are already 
defined in an existing ontology used for multiple purposes in Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) applications: FunGramKB (Periñán-Pascual & Arcas-Túnez 
2010, 2011; Periñán-Pascual 2013). We have used this ontology because of its 
deep semantics foundation: the elements of the ontology are defined both in 
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relation with other elements of the ontology and also through predications that 
encode their perceptual, functional, and taxonomical features.  Thus, 
FunGramKB allows the formulation of the ontology as a complex network of 
conceptual chains defined after several types of relations among the elements of 
the network and the properties of the concept that is encoded. If we can locate 
the semantic break in this network of conceptual chains, not only will we be 
able to account for the data that have already been found in the literature, but 
we will also be laying the ground for future work intended to predict how the 
semantic damage affects the whole conceptual network and, hopefully, how its 
evolution will be. 
 
2. Dimensions of conceptual knowledge organisation in the brain 
As noted above, the literature has observed that whereas some conceptual 
categories are damaged in a group of patients suffering from diverse 
neurological pathologies, others are relatively maintained. Examples of such 
categories are living things like animals, persons and plants, and non-living 
things such as tools, musical instruments, etc. The fact that subjects’ 
performance in different tasks involving these and other categories shows 
differential impairment can be interpreted under the light of different theories 
of conceptual knowledge organization and representation in the brain. 
 Beyond the classical models for semantic memory like the semantic networks 
by Collins & Quillian (1969) and Collins & Loftus (1975); the componential 
theories by Katz & Fodor (1963); the prototype theory by Rosch (1978); and 
the connectionist models like the micro-features theory by Hinton & Shallice 
(1991) and Plaut & Shallice (1993), nowadays, there are two main approaches 
to the encoding of semantic knowledge in the brain: theories based on the 
neural structure principle and theories based on the correlated structure 
principle (Capitani et al. 2003). 
 The approach based on the neural structure principle argues that conceptual 
knowledge is organised in the brain and, that this organisation reflects 
representational constraints imposed by brain conditions: neural structure, 
semantic structure, syntactic structure, etc. The Sensory/Functional Theory 
(Humphreys and Forde, 2001) and the Sensory/Motor Theory (Martin et al. 
2000) belong to this group and defend that conceptual knowledge is distributed 
across different modality-specific semantic subsystems, each dedicated to 
storing and processing a specific type of information (like the Chomskyan 
Faculty of Human Language). The Domain-specific Account (Santos & 
Caramazza 2002) also defends the existence of dimensions in which the 
conceptual knowledge is organised in the brain but these dimensions are 
thought to be modelled after evolutionary history, resulting in domain-specific 
neural circuits dedicated to survival problem solving. Hence, candidate 
domains are animals, conspecifics, etc. All these theories have one common 
claim: damage to one category will equally affect all the concepts belonging to 
that category 
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 The approach based on the correlated structure principle defends, on the 
other hand, that there is no organisation of the conceptual knowledge in the 
brain. Instead, this is just an epiphenomenon derived from the statistical co-
occurrence of the properties of the different objects to be found in reality. 
One of these theories is Caramazza et al.'s (1990) Organised Unitary Content 
Hypothesis, which defends the idea of an uneven conceptual space where the 
closeness of the concepts depends on the amount of properties that are shared 
by them. There is, thus, no semantic organising principle holding in the 
conceptual space of the brain. Its structure just reflects the degree to which 
properties of the objects tend to co-occur in the world. It is hypothesised too 
that concepts that are represented close to one another are encoded by 
neurally continuous clusters that are susceptible to be damaged, which 
accounts for the selective brain damage phenomena. 
 The approaches based on the correlated structure principle resemble 
Wittgenstein's (1953) family resemblance in that the members of families 
share properties, which is the basis of other very well-known theories of 
human categorization like Rosch's (1978) Prototype Theory. Rosch's 
approach, as well as all the ones based on the correlated structure principle, 
succeeds in codifying the observed fact that concepts like ‘bee’ and ‘honey’ 
are more related in reality than ‘spider’ and ‘honey’ are. The more related the 
concepts are in reality, the more closely they should be represented in the 
brain. The correlated structure principle accounts for the horizontal dimension 
of human conceptualization. 
 Additionally, in line with Rosh (1978), there is a second dimension that is 
defined by an economy principle: human beings try to gain as much 
information as possible with the least cognitive effort. The economy principle 
underlies the formation of inclusiveness chains organised in three kinds of 
levels, namely, basic, subordinate and superordinate levels. The first is the 
most salient level from a cognitive and linguistic point of view, and it 
encodes behavioural interaction patterns, thus giving rise to a real and clear 
image of the category. The superordinate level encodes very general 
properties, most often functional roles. It is a collector level in the sense that 
it sorts and classifies basic-level categories. Finally, the subordinate level 
codifies different subtle properties that distinguish different kinds of members 
that belong to the same basic-level. 
 Besides the aforementioned theories, there are other theories that account 
for both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of human conceptualization. 
One such example is Martín-Mingorance's (1998) Lexematic Functional 
Model, which captures both the horizontal dimension in different fields, and 
the vertical dimension through the different inclusion levels on which 
concepts are included and related to one another by means of different 
relations like hypernymy, hyponymy, synonymy, and antonymy. This is one 
of the deepest theoretical foundations of the FunGramKB ontology that we 
will introduce in section 3, and propose to apply in section 4. 
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3. The FunGramKB ontology 
3.1 Theoretical foundations 
The Functional Lexematic Model (FLM), developed by Martín-Mingorance 
(1998), integrated Dik’s (1978a, 1978b, 1989, 1997) Functional Grammar (FG) 
(1978, 1989) and Coseriu’s (1977, 1981, 1992) Lexematics. One of the main 
advantages of the FLM was the onomasiological organization of the lexicon, 
which thought of the lexicon as divided in semantic fields, established a 
hierarchical architecture, and described the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axis 
of the lexicon. In the paradigmatic axis, the lower terms of the hierarchy, called 
hyponyms, were defined by their more generic term or archilexeme. On the 
other hand, the syntagmatic axis adopted FG’s description of terms by means of 
predicate frames. A basic idea in Dik's FG is that a predicate is never an 
isolated item, but always a structure in the sense that predicates exist only as 
part of predicate frames, which define not only the form, but also the type and 
the quantitative and the qualitative valency (participants) of the predicate (Dik, 
1997:2). 
 Later, the Lexical Grammar Model (Faber & Mairal 1999, Mairal & Van 
Valin 2001, Pérez Cabello de Alba 2005, among others) adopted a lexicon 
articulated in lexical classes and organized in meaning hierarchies, where 
inheritance mechanisms played a key role: a lexical item inherits or shares 
certain properties of another lexical item with which it is somehow related. This 
model made use of lexical templates, which encompassed the semantic and 
syntactic information of verbs. Those lexical templates showed the logical 
structure of the predicates, which was adopted from Role and Reference 
Grammar (Mairal & Van Valin 2001), showing the different dimensions of the 
predicates that consisted of two types of variables: external and internal. 
External variables are those aspects of the meaning of a word that are realized 
syntactically; internal variables are those semantic parameters which 
characterize an entire lexical class.   
 The literature on FunGramKB acknowledges both Role and Reference 
Grammar (RRG) (Van Valin 2002, 2005; Van Valin & LaPolla 1997) and the 
Lexical Constructional Model (LCM) (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2008, 
2010, Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza 2009) as the linguistic frameworks on 
which the lexical and grammatical modules of the knowledge base are 
grounded. For a more detailed account of the literature on the premises used to 
build FunGramKB, we address the reader to http://www.fungramkb.com/. As 
represented in Figure 1, The LCM is a comprehensive model of meaning 
construction which provides the analytical tools to account for those aspects of 
meaning construction that go beyond grammar, i.e. implicational, illocutionary 
and even discourse features. Since the outcome of this model is a fully-fledged 
semantic representation, this model was a good candidate for the development 
of natural language processing applications and it was implemented as part of 
FunGramKB, a multipurpose lexico-conceptual knowledge base designed to be 
used for different Natural Language Processing tasks, as we will discuss below 
(Periñán-Pascual 2013; Periñán and Arcas 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2010, 2011; 
Mairal and Periñán 2009, 2010).  
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Figure 1: The architecture of the Lexical Constructional Model (R
Mairal 2008, 2010). LT = lexical template; IT = idiomatic template; CT = constructional 
template; CS = Conceptual Structure 
3.2 The ontology 
FunGramKB is a multilingual and multipurpose lexico
designed to be used for Natural Language Processing tasks. It has three levels of 
information, which are represented in F
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includes a Lexicon and a Morphicon for each of the languages supported; a 
grammatical level, which contains the Gra
specific; and, finally, a conceptual level, which is shared by all languages. The 
conceptual level contains general knowledge in three subcomponents: (i) 
Ontology, which is a hierarchically organized catalogue of conce
have in their mind and which therefore reflects the model of the world shared by a 
community (Mairal Usón & Periñán
is stored in the form of thematic frames, and meaning postulates; (ii) 
where procedural knowledge is gathered by means of 
(cognitive macrostructures); and (iii) 
and events are stored through snapshots 
prototypical cognitive scenarios of events, which indicate the number of 
participants involved and, sometimes, they also contain the selection restrictions set 
on the participants of the event. Meaning postulates contain semantic information 
that is essential to define the properties of a specific concept, whether it be an 
event, an entity or a quality. As showed in Figure 2, both the lexicon and the 
grammaticon are connected up to the cognitive level and they retrieve information 
from there. Thus, the explanatory scope of l
encyclopaedic knowledge, present in the conceptual level, can be accessed. 
Figure 2: The modules of FunGramKB modules (
Since the focus of this study is semantic memory, which is 
ontological module in FunGramKB, we are going to focus only on the 
ontology. A complete description of FunGramKB can be found in the works by 
Periñán Pascual & Arcas Túnez (2011) and Mairal (2012).
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 An ontology is a hierarchical structure made up of universal conceptual units 
which hold inheritance and inference relations among each other. FunGramKB 
ontology is a three-layered conceptual model that comprises three types of 
concepts, where each one of them corresponds to a different conceptual level, 
going from the more general to the more concrete: (i) metaconcepts; (ii) basic 
concepts and (iii) terminal concepts. 
 Metaconcepts constitute the upper level in the taxonomy, they are preceded 
by symbol # and they represent cognitive dimensions (e.g. #ABSTRACT, 
#PHYSICAL, #OBJECT, #FEATURE, #COGNITION, #COMMUNICATION, 
#CREATION, #EMOTION, #MOTION, #TRANSFORMATION, etc.). There 
are three root metaconcepts: #ENTITY, #ATTRIBUTE and #EVENT, which 
correspond to the type of subontology addressed. Metaconcepts are not linked 
to any lexical unit. On the other hand, basic concepts are used as defining units 
which enable the construction of meaning postulates for basic concepts and 
terminal concepts. They are also used as selectional preferences in thematic 
frames. They are preceded by symbol +. Finally, the terminal level is not 
hierarchically structured and terminal concepts are supplied with a series of 
properties. They are preceded by symbol $, and they cannot take part in 
meaning postulates. 
 It is important to highlight that FunGramKB is based on deep semantics. This 
implies that concepts establish inheritance and inference relations among each 
other, and also, each concept is individually defined by one of two properties: a 
Thematic Frame (TF) which indicates the number and type of participants 
involved in an event, and a Meaning Postulate (MP) which contains semantic 
information that is essential to define the properties of a specific concept. On 
the other hand, we say that it is linguistically motivated because in order to 
create a concept in the ontology, there must exist at least one lexical unit in a 
given language that is not already defined by any of the existing concepts in the 
ontology. The semantic information contained in the MP of concepts shows the 
connection among different conceptual units, and, in this way, their meaning 
postulates make it possible to establish relations among concepts.  
 As proposed in Pérez Cabello de Alba (2017), we can use FunGramKB 
ontology for the description of semantic categories in order to establish 
enriched conceptual networks which would reflect (a) inheritance relations, i.e. 
the onomasiological structure of concepts, and (b) inference relations, i.e. the 
concepts a given conceptual unit is linked to through its meaning postulates. 
More specifically, by using meaning postulates (MMPP) we can help in 
identification tasks of memory loss. We could for instance detect the point of 
the conceptual route where a breakdown is produced, which is what we will put 
forward in the next section. We could also evaluate whether the loss of a given 
predication would affect other concepts associated by means of a relation of 
inference. So, for instance, if we find a given feature such as +PET_00 in the 
meaning postulate of +DOG_00, and we have the same feature in another 
concept such as +CAT_00, we can assume that if someone is asked to name 
different types of pet animals, they will say both dog and cat. 
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 By way of example, in FunGramKB ontology, a concept like ‘dog’ will have the 
following hierarchical representation: 
Figure 3: Conceptual chain of +DOG_00 
 
In Figure 3 we see that the concept +DOG_00 is defined, going from the most 
general to the most specific conceptualization, as an entity (#ENTITY), which is 
physical (#PHYSICAL), is an object (#OBJECT), is self-contained 
(#SELF_CONNECTED_OBJECT), is a natural object (+NATURAL 
_OBJECT_00), is corpuscular (+CORPUSCULAR_00), is solid (+SOLID_00), is 
an organism (+ORGANISM_00), is an animal (+ANIMAL_00), is a vertebrate 
(+VERTEBRATE_00), and is a mammal (+MAMMAL_00).  
 As we have previously said, metaconcepts play a role of hidden categories used 
as superordinates in order to avoid circularity among definitions of concepts lower 
down in the hierarchy, and they are not linked to any lexical unit. In Figure 4 we 
show the hierarchical arrangement of the metaconcepts that play a role in the 
definition of +DOG_00. 
 
Figure 4: The Ontology of entities 
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On the other hand, we have said that the description of basic or terminal concepts is 
made by means of meaning postulates. A meaning postulate is made up of one or 
more connected predications, which carry the generic features of the concept. If a 
predication is preceded by the symbol “+” it means that it is always the case, and 
we call it “strict predication”; on the other hand, if it is preceded by the symbol 
“*”, it means that, although that is a typical feature of the concept, it does not have 
to be always true, and it is called “defeasible predication”.  
 By way of illustration, we present the editor interface of FunGramKB in Figure 
5, where the predications that are part of the meaning postulates of the concept 
+DOG_00 can be seen: 
Figure 5: Meaning postulates of the concept +DOG_00
As we can see in Figure 5 above, the meaning postulates of the concept +DOG_00 
consist of the following predications encoded in the COREL language (Periñán
Pascual and Mairal 2010): 
1. +(e1: +BE_00 (x1: +DOG_00)Theme (x2: +MA
2. *(e2: +BE_01 (x1)Theme (x3: +TAME_00)Attribute)
3. *(e3: +EAT_00 (x1)Agent (x4: +MEAT_00 ^ +BONE_00)Theme 
(x5)Location(x6)Origin (x7)Goal) 
4. *(e4: +BE_01 (x1)Theme (x8: +PET_00)Attribute)
5. *(e5: +BE_01 (x1)Theme (x9: +FRIENDLY_00)Attribute)
If we reword the previous predications in natural language, we have the following 
correspondences: 
1. A dog is always a mammal. 
2. A typical dog is tame, but it could not be the case (we can find wild dogs).
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3. A typical dog eats meat or bones, but it can not be the 
dogs who are fed on dog food).
4. A typical dog is a pet, but not always.
5. A typical dog is friendly, but not always.
Finally, in FunGramKB ontology we come across subconcepts, which are a 
refinement of the possible candidates, called selecti
thematic frame of an already existing basic or terminal concept. They represent 
those cases in which the conceptual restriction or specification takes place 
exclusively in one or all of the participants of the thematic frame of a b
terminal concept, without varying its meaning postulate. They are preceded by a 
hyphen (-). An example would be –BARK. Figure 6 below shows the FunGramKB 
editor interface with the predications that define barking as a specification of the 
sound that dogs make with their mouth. In other words, a subconcept is a 
specification in the thematic frame of another conceptual unit. In this case, the 
participant involved in the event of making a sound is further specified by stating 
that the creature who emits this kind of sound with his mouth is a dog and no other 
kind of animal. 
 
Figure 6: Predications of the subconcept 
3.3 Inheritance and inference relations
As stated in Pérez Cabello de Alba
give account of typification, namely, the “is a” relation, in a way that the first 
predication of every concept always contains the relation of the concept with its 
immediate father. Taxonomy, i. e. “there are several types of” rela
accounted for in terms of inheritance, and all concepts which hold a relationship of 
sisterhood will be under the same father concept, so they will then share the x2 
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(second) component of their first strict predication. It is important to point out that 
the top-down organization of concepts is accounted for in FunGramKB in a way 
that the same definition is inherited by all the entities belonging to a class. Thus, 
the information in the rubric “Description” for the concept +MAMMAL_00, i.e. 
“any warm-blooded vertebrate, having the skin more or less covered with hair, 
nourishing the young with milk, and, with the exception of the egg-laying 
monotremes, giving birth to live young” appears uniformly allocated to all its 
hyponymic concepts existent in the conceptual hierarchy, such as +BEAR_00, 
+CAT_00, +DOG_00, +HORSE_00, to name just a few examples.  
 On the other hand, through inference relations we obtain the features that 
concepts share with other entities of the ontology to which they are not related 
through an inheritance relation. The microknowing in FunGramKB (Periñán and 
Arcas, 2005) gives us the extended meaning postulate, and puts in connection the 
basic concepts which appear in the meaning postulates in the ontology. Let us take, 
for example, the cases of +DOG_00 in Figure X and –BARK in Figure 7 below. 
 
 
Figure 7: Some of the inference relations of the concept +DOG_00 
In Figure 7 we have two root metaconcepts, one of the type #ENTITY and another 
one of the type #EVENT. There is a hierarchical organization within each 
metaconcept where inheritance relations are established. If we go to the subconcept –
BARK, we see that relations with other concepts are established through the basic 
concepts that appear in its conceptual definition. In this way, we see that there is a 
relation with the entities +DOG_00 and +MOUTH_00. In this way, concepts in the 
ontology are interconnected and this fact allows us to replicate the way in which 
semantic memory works.  
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 Thus, both types of relations - inheritance and inference - allow us to create 
complex and rich networks where the concepts access the information by their 
onomasiological situation through inheritance relations with their hypernyms, and by 
inference relation or by the predications they encode themselves. It is this kind of 
rich semantic network that will allow us to locate the breakdown in cases of semantic 
memory loss, as we will show in the next section. 
4. Location of the damage along the conceptual routes in semantic memory loss 
Ever since Warrington & Shallice's (1984) work, many studies, whether these build 
upon the neural structure principle or the correlated structure principle, corroborate 
the dichotomy between living and non-living things in semantic memory loss (see 
also Basso, Capitani & Laiacona 1988). More recent studies like Zannino et al. 
(2006) confirm the existence of a category specific semantic loss in Alzheimer's 
patients who have more difficulty in the processing of living thing categories than 
non-living ones. In addition, there seems to be a double dissociation, since there are 
patients who have problems with living things but not with non-living things, while 
there are other patients that show the reverse pattern (Hillis & Caramazza 1995). 
The picture gets more complicated when we look at patients that do not fit into 
either of these patterns. For example, some patients have problems with living 
things but have, nevertheless, a normal performance with categories that refer to 
body parts, which are clearly part of living things (cf. Warrington & Shallice 1984; 
Silveri & Gainotti 1988; Siri et al. 2003). Yet another issue that gets things even 
more complicated is the fact that some patients' performance does not fit into either 
dichotomy. A case in point is described in Siri et al. (2003): the patient had 
problems with fruits, vegetables, musical instruments and birds, while s/he 
preserved relatively good performance with animals, parts of the human body and 
furniture. Some other categories like tools, clothing and vehicles, are maintained 
but not consistently. This case study resorts to several kinds of tasks like picture 
and category naming and measures other cognitive abilities of the patient. 
 By means of a naming task for different categories, Peraita & Grasso (2010) 
aimed to study differential category loss in Spanish speakers who suffer from 
Alzheimer. They used a model for semantic memory based on features and 
componential analysis, distinguishing between features that make up categories and 
the relations between these features and the categories they belong to. So, every 
category is composed of several features that are related with the concept by 
several kinds of relations such as taxonomic (X is a kind of Y), perceptual (X is a 
property of Y), or functional (X is for Y-ing). Note that this model resembles the 
Functional Lexematic Model (Martín Mingorance 1998), which is one of the 
foundations upon which the linguistic module of FunGramKB builds, together with 
Putstejovsky's (1991) qualia relations. Peraita & Grasso demonstrate with their 
empirical data that not only can a differential loss between living and non-living 
things be defined, but also across several kinds of features according to their 
relation to the category. That is, taxonomic features are the most complicated 
features for these patients, while the easiest ones are part-whole features. However, 
the latter features are also the ones that are more rapidly lost, whereas functional 
features are the ones that are best preserved along the illness.  
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 The models based on the correlated structure principle predict that the loss of 
one category will affect all the concepts that depend on that category. For example, 
if a patient has lost the concept ‘animal’, then all the categories that depend upon 
‘animal’ will be lost too, such as ‘dog’ and ‘horse’. However, this is not case for 
Siri et al.’s (2003) patient, among others, who presented problems with living 
things in general (fruits, vegetables, birds) but he had a relatively preserved 
performance with certain living things like animals other than birds and human 
body parts. He had a spared performance with some non-living things like furniture 
but not with others like tools, kitchen items, toys and vehicles, and musical 
instruments. This pattern defies the models based on the neural structure principle 
too since these concepts do not share modality knowledge nor do they belong to 
any of Santos & Caramazza's (2002) evolutionary-based domains. So, this case and 
others that we will review below, pose an important challenge to these theories.  
 Warrinton & Shallice found a very specific pattern of semantic memory loss in 
four of their (1984) study patients: they had problems with living things categories 
like flowers, fruits, trees, vegetables and animals, whereas they maintained a good 
performance with non-living things categories like clothing, furniture, kitchen 
utensils, and vehicles. They assumed then that all categories that depended upon 
the superordinate living things category were damaged: animals (dogs, horses, 
etc.), people, and plants (flowers, fruits, vegetables, etc.). This accounted for this 
poor performance on categories like flowers, fruits, trees, vegetables and animals, 
all living things, in contrast to the normal performance on other categories like 
clothing, furniture, kitchen utensils and vehicles, all non-living things. The 
prediction is, thus, that the patients with this pattern of semantic memory loss, i.e. 
problems with living things but who perform well with non-living things, will have 
problems with all living thing categories like for example, monkey, banana, lion, 
and priest; while they will have a good performance with all non-living things like, 
for example, table, vase, rock, and train. 
 While some studies like Peraita & Grasso (2010) and Zannino et. al (2006) have 
fulfilled this prediction and corroborated Warrington and Shallice's results, i.e. 
problems with living thing categories and no problems with non-living thing 
categories, many others have provided empirical data showing that this is not 
always accurate and the prediction that all living thing categories are damaged 
while all non-living thing categories are maintained is not always the case. For 
example, J.B. was a patient described by Warrington & Shallice (1984) whose 
pattern of semantic memory loss was quite different from the pattern they found in 
their first four patients: he had problems with some non-living things (metals, 
clothes and precious stones) but not with others (furniture, vehicles and kitchen 
utensils); besides, he had problems with livings things, as expected, but he 
maintained a good performance with body parts, which are part of living things. 
Other patients who have problems with living things but not with body parts have 
been presented by Silveri & Gainotti (1988) and Siri et al. (2003). Hart, Berdt & 
Caramazza (1985) presented the performance of M.D.'s, who had problems with 
some living things (fruits and vegetables), but surprisingly, he had no problems 
with animals. Caramazza & Shelton (1998) presented E.W., whose performance 
was compromised with some living things (animals) but not with other living 
things and non-living things. These results pose a problem not only for the original 
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hypothesis of Warrington & Shallice but also for the Sensory/Functional Theory, 
since the pattern of semantic memory loss is unrelated to the different modality-
specific semantic subsystems that are resorted to. Finally, researchers like Siri et al. 
(2003) have provided empirical data from patients that are quite difficult to fit into 
any pattern of semantic loss: J.P. had problems with some living things like fruits, 
vegetables, and birds but not with others like animals and human body parts; 
besides he had problems with some non-living things like musical instruments but 
not with others like furniture; furthermore the performance varied depending on the 
experimental task J.P. had to face (category naming, name-picture matching, etc.).     
 We propose to use FunGramKB's conceptual chains defined by inheritance and 
inference relations, which will provide the foundation of a unitary explanation for 
the different semantic memory loss patterns shown by patients described by 
Warrington & Shallice (1984), Hart, Bendt & Caramazza (1985), Caramazza & 
Shelton (1998), and Siri et al. (2003). As seen in section 3, FunGramKB is a 
knowledge base that codifies different kinds of information: conceptual, lexical, 
morphological, grammatical, pragmatic, and even cultural and used-based 
information. The core part of the knowledge base is the ontology, which is a 
collection of encoded concepts organized in chains defined after inheritance 
relations. This way, the conceptual information has to be encoded only once, and 
then, it may be shared by different concepts by either inheritance relations – if the 
goal and target concepts are in the same chain – or by inference relations – if the 
goal and target concepts are not in the same chain. In what follows, we are going to 
show how FunGramKB’s ontology can be used to help us define fine-grained 
conceptual routes, based upon inheritance and inference relations, along which the 
conceptual damage in different kinds of semantic loss can be located.  
Consequently, this will lay the ground for the characterization of different memory 
loss patterns in terms of how some conceptual routes are broken, or rather, where 
the break is located along such conceptual routes. So, we will show that 
FunGramKB’s conceptual chains allow us to explain “canonical” cases like 
Warrington & Shallice's (1984), as well as other “non-canonical” ones like Siri et 
al.'s (2003) patient, without defining evolutionary-based domains, without resorting 
to modality-based knowledge, and correctly constraining the semantic loss patterns 
to be found. This will allow checking predicted loss patterns against empirical data 
from patients in future research. 
 We are going to use the conceptual chains of the ontology of FunGramKB 
defined after the inheritance relations among concepts, as discussed in section 3, 
and locate the break along such chains. Note that we are assuming without further 
argumentation that the conceptual organization in the brain equals, somehow, the 
conceptual organization in the FunGramKB ontology. We do so for the sake of 
simplicity: we just want to show that a linguistically rooted theory of conceptual 
organization can help us understand the empirical data found so far. Depending on 
the location of the break, a certain subset of categories will be affected. The higher 
in the ontology the break is, the more general the damage will be and the more 
categories will be lost. Figure 8 shows the conceptual chains for the most studied 
categories in the reviewed literature: categories like dog, cat, and horse are 
hyponyms of +ANIMAL_00; tree, vegetables, and fruits are hyponyms of 
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+PLANT_00, and non-living things like furniture, clothing, tools, and vehicles are 
all hyponyms of +SOLID_00. 
 
Figure 8: Conceptual chains for the most studied categories in the literature 
The classical prediction is that patients who show problems with living things will 
show problems with all living things and no problems with any non-living thing. 
This pattern is easily accounted for if a break can be located in the chain at the 
level +ORGANISM_00. If so, all living things will be damaged, including plants 
(+PLANT_00), animals (+ANIMAL_00), and human beings (+HUMAN_00). 
Other concepts, more specifically, non-living things (e.g. +TABLE_00), will be 
unhampered because they do not depend on the basic concept +ORGANISM_00. 
 However, we have argued that this prediction of a perfect break between living 
and non-living things is not borne out in all the cases. Hart et al.'s (1985) M.D. 
patient had problems with some living things (fruits and vegetables) but not with 
animals. If the break was on +ORGANISM_00, animal categories would be 
affected. Empirical data thus support that idea that there is a break somewhere 
lower than +ORGANISM_00. One possibility is that there are two more local 
breaks on the +PLANT_00 level. This accounts for the problems with fruits and 
vegetables, both of them hyponyms of +PLANT_00, while preserving animal 
categories, hyponyms of +ANIMAL_00 and not dependent of +PLANT_00. The 
lower the break is along the conceptual chain, the more restricted the semantic 
memory loss is. Caramazza & Shelton's (1998) E.W. patient had a reverse semantic 
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memory loss pattern: he had problems with animals but not with other living 
things, as well as non-living things. They argued that these data pose a problem for 
the Sensory/Functional theory since all these concepts resort to the same modality-
specific semantic subsystems, which would ensure that both categories (animals 
and plants) are either damaged or unhampered. If we use FunGramKB ontology, 
these two patterns can be derived without further machinery: while the break in 
M.D. is on the level of +PLANT_00, and hence he had problems with fruits and 
vegetables but not with animals, the break in E.W. is on the level of 
+ANIMAL_00, which accounts for the loss of animal categories but not of other 
living thing categories. 
 Things, however, are far more complicated as Warrington & Shallice's J.B and 
Siri et al.'s J.P. show: these patients had problems with living things but not with 
body parts, which are clearly related to living things since they are parts of them. 
This seems unexpected unless we look at the location of the category 
+BODY_PART_00 in FunGramKB, which is represented in Figure 9: 
Figure 9: Conceptual chain for body parts 
Concepts like ‘eye’, ‘ear’, ‘mouth’, etc., are hyponyms of +BODY_PART_00, 
which is a hyponym of the categories +NATURAL_PART_00, +PART_00, 
#FEATURE_00 and #OBJECT_00. This means that +BODY_PART does not 
depend upon +HUMAN_00 or +ANIMAL_00, which are quite lower in the chain, 
although they do contain this information in their meaning postulates. For example, 
one of the predications of +EYE_00 is *(e3: +SEE_00 (x4: +HUMAN_00 ^ 
+ANIMAL_00)Theme (x5)Referent (f2: x1)Instrument), which refers to 
+HUMAN_00. The prediction is, thus, that patients that have problems with 
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animals (and therefore a break on the level of +ANIMAL_00), humans (and so a 
break on the level of +HUMAN_00), and with all living things (and accordingly a 
break on the level of +ORGANISM_00) will not have problems, in principle, with 
body parts, because they depend on other categories higher in the chain. In other 
words, body parts follow a completely different conceptual route than animals, 
humans, and all the other living things. Thus, the empirical data from both J.B. and 
J.P. are accounted for and, as a matter of fact, expected from the configuration of 
the conceptual chains in FunGramKB. 
 Then, why are there patients that have problems with body parts? In order to 
give a proper account of this, let us look at the predications involved in the concept 
+BODY_PART_00 and the related concept +BODY_00, which we show in Figure 
10: 
 
Figure 10: Predications of +BODY_PART_00 and +BODY_00  
The meaning postulates of +BODY-PART_00 are made up of the following two 
predications: 
• +(e1: +BE_00 (x1: +BODY_PART_00)Theme (x2: 
+NATURAL_PART_00) Referent) 
• *(e2: +COMPRISE_00 (x3: +BODY_00)Theme (x1)Referent) 
We see that +BODY_PART_00 comprises the concept +BODY_00 (first 
predication above), which is a hyponym of +SOLID_00 and at the same level as 
+ORGANISM_00. This implies that even a break in +ORGANISM_00 would not 
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affect +BODY_00, which makes both +BODY_00 and +BODY_PART_00 quite 
robust categories for semantic memory loss. If we look at the predications of 
+BODY_00 we find links to the concepts +ANIMAL_00 and +HUMAN_00, 
which are hyponyms of +ORGANISM_00. Note that the links to these conceptual 
units are obtained via inference relations rather than inheritance relations. This 
means that a patient that has lost ‘animal’ and ‘human’ categories has not lost these 
categories themselves but the access to them through the conceptual chains that are 
defined after inheritance relations. Probably, the concepts that belong to these 
categories are, to a certain extent, still available through other ways, more 
specifically, through inference relations. Nonetheless, if these relations are 
damaged, concepts belonging to +ANIMAL_00 or +HUMAN_00 will be 
completely inaccessible. Hence, the loss of body part categories may not indicate a 
break in the conceptual chain, which is defined after inheritance relations. For 
example, it may indicate the presence of damage either to the inference relations 
established in the network or to the patient’s ability to establish such relations. This 
is a qualitatively different kind of damage to semantic memory, whose 
consequences are more devastating: if inheritance relations are broken, then a 
subset of concepts are damaged and, then, inaccessible through the conceptual 
route. These concepts can, nevertheless, be accessed through inference relations 
from other concepts. If, on the other hand, the inference relations are broken, then 
the concepts affected by the break in the conceptual chain will be completely 
inaccessible. Therefore, the body part categories can be used in a diagnostic 
process to check whether inference relations are impaired or not: if not, the patient 
will probably have problems only with inheritance relations and then we should 
establish the location of the break or breaks along the conceptual chain. If, on the 
contrary, the patient has problems with body part categories, this indicates that the 
damage is bigger and qualitatively different, which may indicate that its evolution 
is different from the evolution found when the damage involves broken inheritance 
chains. 
5. Conclusions and lines for further research 
We have used FunGramKB ontology to explain different patterns of semantic 
memory loss, which were previously unaccounted for in a unified way. This 
ontology allows two kinds of relations: inheritance and inference relations. The 
first type defines conceptual chains along which one or more breaks can be located, 
which triggers different semantic memory loss patterns. 
 We have seen that besides breaks along the conceptual chain, i.e. damage to 
certain inheritance relations, also the inference relations can be hampered, which 
makes the damage bigger and qualitatively different. Categories of body parts 
indicate whether there is loss of this latter type of relation in the semantic memory. 
 It is our hope that this work lays the ground for future work that relates different 
semantic memory loss patterns to breaks at different locations along the conceptual 
routes and damage to inference relations, which will all together allow a finer-
grained pattern with many predictions. These patterns, in turn, will be related with 
different types of dementia and brain damage, so that they become markers for 
non-invasive diagnostic of such conditions. 
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